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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Nicolescu appeals from the district court's appellate decision reversing the 
magistrate court's order to suppress evidence and remanding the case for further 
proceedings. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court adopted the following findings from the magistrate court as the 
undisputed facts of this case: 
On October 15, 2011 Defendant, Kevin M. Nicolescu (Nicolescu) was 
involved in a two vehicle collision at the intersection of Idaho and 16th 
streets in Boise, Idaho. Boise City Police Officer Ransom responded to 
the scene. Officer Chris Palic of the Boise City Police Department then 
arrived on the scene and was directed to speak with Nicolescu. 
Nicolescu informed Officer Palic that he had proceeded through a green 
light west bound on Idaho Street when the other vehicle northbound on 
16th Street apparently ran a red light and collided with his vehicle. While 
speaking with Nicolescu, Officer Palic detected a strong odor of an 
alcoholic beverage. In addition, Officer Palic noted that Nicolescu had 
red, bloodshot and watery eyes. There was no indication of slurred 
speech or impaired memory. There were some minor cuts and abrasions 
to Nicolescu's face, which Palic assumed were caused by the deployment 
of the airbag during the collision. Nicolescu agreed to speak with Palic. 
Nicolescu admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier that evening. 
Officer Palic requested Nicolescu submit to a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus 
(HGN) test. After starting the HGN test, Officer Palic had scored 
Nicolescu with 4 of 6 decision points, but did not complete the test due to 
an injury to Nicolescu's left eye which had occurred as a result of the 
accident. Nicolescu then indicated that his adrenaline was kicking in and 
Officer Palic observed Nicolescu's legs shaking and that he was unsteady 
on his feet. 
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Palic discussed his observations with Officer Larry Moore, who was also 
on the scene. Palic explained to Moore that he had observed a strong 
odor of alcohol, glassy and bloodshot eyes, that Nicolescu had scored 4 of 
6 decision points on the HGN (which would have been a failure) prior to 
terminating the test and that Nicolescu admitted he had consumed alcohol 
earlier that evening. The watery bloodshot eyes could have been caused 
by debris from the airbag deploying in the accident and it is also possible 
they resulted from Nicolescu consuming alcohol or even a combination of 
both factors. Palic explained that he did not want to perform other FSTs 
because Nicolescu was visibly shaken by the accident. 
Palic was not aware of any traffic infractions or driving pattern because his 
only contact with Nicolescu was after the accident. Palic testified that he 
felt that he had enough information to arrest Nicolescu for suspicion of 
DUI. Palic testified that based on the totality of the circumstances he told 
Officer Moore that he felt Nicolescu was not safe to operate a motor 
vehicle. Officer Moore, who had witnessed the discussion between Palic 
and Nicolescu, agreed that Palic should continue his investigation to 
determine if Nicolescu was safe to operate a motor vehicle or whether he 
might be under the influence of alcohol. Paramedics on the scene 
examined Nicolescu and noted that he had a scratched cornea[.] 
Thereafter, Officer Palic told Nicolescu that he was not going to continue 
the HGN test because of the eye injury and because Nicolescu was 
shaken up. 
Palic then stated: 'What I am going to have you do is blow into a device 
(Alcosensor) and we'll just go from there. O.K. and we'll go from there. I 
will make my determination from there.' 
Nicolescu replied: 'Dude, I'm willing to cooperate however.' 
Palic stated: 'It will be a lot easier to do it this way, O.K.' 
There was no audible response by Nicolescu and Palic then continued by 
explaining that Nicolescu would need to make a tight seal around the pipe 
and blow real hard. 
Nicolescu submitted to the preliminary breath test [PST] on the Alco-
Sensor, which is a handheld breath alcohol tester. The Alco-Sensor is not 
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certified and is not performance verified. It is used to detect the presence 
of alcohol in individuals. The result of the preliminary Alco-Sensor test 
was .108 which is over the legal limit. Officer Palic then handcuffed 
Nicolescu and placed him in Palic's patrol vehicle to provide further breath 
samples. After a 15 minute wait period and an ALS [administrative license 
suspension] advisory, using the Lifeloc instrument ... Nicolescu provided 
further samples which registered results of .103 and .096. Nicolescu was 
then cited-not arrested-for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a 
misdemeanor violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. Nicolescu was not 
transported to the Ada County Jail to be booked for the DUI, rather he was 
transported to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for treatment of the 
eye injury. Memorandum Decision & Order, at 1-4. 
(R., pp.162-65 (footnote omitted).) 
Nicolescu moved to suppress the breath test evidence arguing that officers 
lacked "the necessary probable cause or reasonable suspicion" to require Nicolescu to 
submit to evidentiary testing "absent the result of the preliminary breath test," and that 
police were not permitted to require Nicolescu to submit to a preliminary breath test. 
(R., pp.38-48.) The magistrate court granted Nicolescu's motion (R., pp.73-82), and the 
state appealed (R., pp.86-87). Finding that Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a preliminary breath test in conjunction with other field sobriety tests, the district 
court reversed the magistrate's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
(R., pp.162-74.) Nicolescu filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.176-78.) 
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ISSUE 
Nicolescu states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Whether the District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that 
the Preliminary Breath Test was not an Evidentiary Test as described 
under the Idaho Code; 
B. Whether the District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that 
Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion was the Legal Standard to 
Administer the Preliminary Breath Test; and 
C. Whether the District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that 
the preliminary breath test result could be used to form the basis of 
probable cause to administer further evidentiary testing. 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Nicolescu failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision 




Nicolescu Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Appellate Decision 
Reversing The Magistrate's Order To Suppress Evidence 
A. Introduction 
In the magistrate court below, Nicolescu filed a motion to suppress evidence (R., 
pp.38-48), which was granted by that court (R., pp.73-82). The state appealed to the 
district court (R., pp.86-87), and the district court reversed (R., pp.162-74). On appeal, 
Nicolescu argues that the district court erred in its determination. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.9-30.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, 
shows no error by the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate 
capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's decision." State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. 
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)). When a decision on a motion to 
suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that 
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 
739,741 (2007). 
C. Officer Palic Could Require Nicolescu To Submit To A Preliminary Breath Test 
On Reasonable Suspicion That Nicolescu Was Driving Under The Influence 
Below, Nicolescu argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when 
Officer Palic required him to submit to a preliminary breath test while investigating 
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whether Nicolescu was driving under the influence of alcohol. (R., pp.38-48.) The 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. While routine 
traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed 
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because a traffic stop is more similar to an 
investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). "An 
investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which 
justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983,88 P.3d at 1223 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
The Court of Appeals has long recognized that "the administration of field 
sobriety tests following a traffic stop is but an investigative detention." State v. Ferreira, 
133 Idaho 474,480,988 P.2d 700, 706 (Ct. App. 1999). "[F]ield sobriety tests may be 
conducted without consent during an otherwise permissible detention, where they are 
justified by reason of suspicion of DUI." State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54,56,175 P.3d 216, 
218 (Ct. App. 2008). The reasonableness of the police officer's suspicion is evaluated 
based upon th.e totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
at 417-18; State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930,932,829 P.2d 520,522 (1992). 
Preliminary breath tests, conducted in the field for the purpose of confirming or 
dispelling an officer's reasonable suspicion that a suspect has been driving under the 
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influence of alcohol, are directly analogous to other field sobriety tests. See Indiana v. 
Lucas, 934 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind. App. 2012) ("PBTs are akin to general field sobriety 
tests and provide officers with a simple method for making a threshold determination as 
to whether a person has consumed alcohol."). Like other field sobriety tests, a 
preliminary breath test may be administered where an officer has reasonable suspicion 
that an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol. Vermont v. Therrien, 
38 A.3d 1129, 1131 (Vt. 2011); Minnesota v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Minn. App. 
2012) (citing Hager v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 328 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. App. 1986». 
See also 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1547(k) (police may require suspect to submit to a 
preliminary breath test on reasonable suspicion that the suspect is driving while under 
the influence of alcohol); Kan. Stat. Ann. 2010 Supp. 8-1012(b) (same). The relevant 
question, therefore, is whether Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion that Nicolescu 
was driving under the influence of alcohol in order to require him to submit to a 
preliminary breath test. 
It is undisputed in this case that Nicolescu was involved in a vehicular accident at 
around 2 a.m. when, apparently, another driver ran a red light and collided with him. 
(R., pp.163-64.) Responding to that accident, Officer Palic detected the strong odor of 
an alcoholic beverage emanating from Nicolescu. (R., p.163.) Nicolescu admitted that 
he had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening. (Id.) His eyes were red, bloodshot, 
and watery, and his legs were shaking and he was unsteady on his feet. (Id.) Officer 
Palic asked Nicolescu to perform an HGN test. (Id.) After Nicolescu scored 4 of 6 
decision points on the HGN, which was already a failing score, Officer Palic decided to 
terminate the test. (R., pp.163-64.) 
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Officer Palic terminated the test because, as a result of the accident, Nicolescu's 
left cornea was scratched and he was clearly shaken up. (Id.) Officer Palic did not 
require Nicolescu to perform other standard field sobriety tests for the same reason. 
(ld.) Nicolescu's red, bloodshot, watery eyes and failure on the HGN could have been 
caused from intoxication, or from his injuries. Likewise, Nicolescu's inability to perform 
standard field sobriety tests, due to his shaking and unsteady legs, could have been 
caused from intoxication or from adrenaline due to the accident. Of course, Officer 
Palic was not required to end his investigation due to the existence of these innocent 
explanations. See State v. Rader, 135 Idaho 273, 276, 16 P.3d 949, 952 (Ct. App. 
2000) ("the existence of alternative innocent explanations of the circumstances does not 
negate the fact that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that a crime might have been 
committed"). Rather, under these circumstances, where standard field sobriety tests 
and the HGN test were inadequate, using the preliminary breath test was the most 
reasonable, non intrusive means of confirming or dispelling Officer Palic's reasonable 
suspicion that Nicolescu was driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, where Nicolescu smelled of 
alcohol, admitted he had been drinking, had red, bloodshot, and watery eyes, failed the 
HGN test, and could not perform other standard field sobriety tests due to his shaking 
and unsteady legs, Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion to require him to submit to a 
preliminary breath test. The district court properly reversed the magistrate court's order 
excluding evidence of Nicolescu's intoxication and should be affirmed. 
Nicolescu argues on appeal that the district court erred by finding that the 
preliminary breath test administered in this case was not an evidentiary test under Idaho 
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Code § 18-8002(1), asserting, "[fJrom the statutory language, it is clear that an 
evidentiary test is any breath, urine or blood test used to determine the concentration of 
alcohol in a person, regardless of the admissibility of the results.,,1 (Appellant's brief, 
pp.9-14.) If Nicolescu's interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) is correct, then his 
entire appeal fails. 
Under Idaho Code § 18-8002(1), "any person who drives or is in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to 
evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol" as long as the test "is administered at 
the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has 
been driving" while under the influence. In State v. Diaz, the Idaho Supreme Court 
determined that the implied consent provision of this statute authorizes an officer to 
administer such evidentiary tests based on reasonable suspicion that the suspect had 
been driving while under the influence. 144 Idaho at 302-03, 160 P.3d at 741-42. In 
that case, the Supreme Court determined "reasonable grounds to suspect that Diaz was 
driving under the influence" existed due to Diaz's "erratic driving, bloodshot and glassy 
eyes, and slurred speech." ~ 
As set forth above, Officer Palic likewise had reasonable grounds to suspect that 
Nicolescu was driving under the influence in this case: Nicolescu was involved in a 
vehicular collision at 2:00 a.m.; Officer Palic could smell the strong odor of alcohol on 
Nicolescu; Nicolescu admitted he had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening; he had 
1 The district court is in fact correct. The requirements for "evidentiary testing" are set 
forth in Idaho Code § 18-8002A(1)(e). Because the preliminary breath test in this case 
was not "performed by ... a [method] approved by the Idaho state police," and 
standards such as a 15-minute waiting period before administering the test were not 
observed (R., pp.164; 172 n.2), it would not qualify as an "evidentiary test" under the 
statute. It does, however, qualify as a properly administered field sobriety test. 
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red, bloodshot, and watery eyes; Nicolescu had already failed the HGN test before 
Officer Palic aborted it; and Nicolescu could not perform other standard field sobriety 
tests due to his shaking and unsteady legs. Taken together, these circumstances are 
sufficient to support the district court's reasonable suspicion determination. If the 
preliminary breath test is an evidentiary test as Nicolescu asserts, then it was properly 
administered under the implied consent provision of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1). 
Nicolescu also argues that the district court erred by determining that the results 
of the preliminary breath test could be considered among other factors to support 
Officer Palic's reasonable suspicion that Nicolescu was driving under the influence and 
require him to submit to additional evidentiary testing. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-29.) 
Assuming, as the district court did, that preliminary breath tests do not constitute 
evidentiary tests for purposes of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1), a failing score is still good 
evidence by which an officer would have reasonable grounds to suspect that a driver is 
under the influence of alcohol Nicolescu has failed to show any reason that an officer 
should be prevented from considering the results of a preliminary breath test among 
other factors under a totality of the circumstances analysis, regardless of that test's 
admissibility at trial. See State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408, 283 P.3d 722, 725 
(2012) ("[I]t is not necessary that police officers rely only on evidence which will be 
admissible in court in finding a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.") (citing State v. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,813-14,203 P.3d 1203, 1212-13 (2009)). 
Moreover, even if Officer Palic could not rely on the results of the preliminary 
breath test in determining whether to administer an evidentiary test that would be 
admissible at trial, Nicolescu's argument still fails. Reasonable and articulable 
10 
suspicion is an objective test which does not depend on an officer's subjective beliefs. 
Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998). As explained above, 
under the implied consent provision of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1), when an officer has 
"reasonable grounds to believe [aJ person has been driving" while under the influence of 
alcohol, he is authorized to administer an evidentiary test of the suspect's blood, breath, 
or urine. In this case, Officer Palic had "reasonable grounds to believe" that Nicolescu 
had been driving while intoxicated. With or without the results of the preliminary breath 
test, Officer Palic was authorized to administer the second evidentiary test based on his 
objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion. 2 
Nicolescu has failed to show any error by the district court. Preliminary breath 
tests are a type of field sobriety test, administrable under the same standards of 
reasonable suspicion which govern the administration of all field sobriety tests. Under 
the totality of the circumstances of this case, Officer Palic had sufficient reasonable 
suspicion to require Nicolescu to submit to a preliminary breath test. The district court 
correctly reversed the magistrate court's order excluding evidence of Nicolescu's 
intoxication and should be affirmed. 
2 Nicolescu also asserts that probable cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, should 
be the standard for administering preliminary breath tests. (Appellant's brief, pp.17 -24.) 
His argument fails. First, preliminary breath tests are a type of field sobriety test and, as 
in all other field sobriety tests, the reasonable suspicion standard applies to their 
administration. Buell, 145 Idaho at 56, 175 P.3d at 218; Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 480,988 
P.2d at 706. Second, even if preliminary breath tests are evidentiary tests, then the 
implied consent provision of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) controls and the preliminary 
breath test may be administered upon reasonable suspicion that the suspect has been 
driving while under the influence. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302-03, 160 P.3d at 741-42; I.C. § 
18-8002(1). Either way, reasonable suspicion is the standard. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's appellate 
decision reversing the magistrate's order suppressing evidence and remanding this 
case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 5th day of November, 2013. 
~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of November, 2013, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing two copies in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
ED GUERRICABEITIA 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP 
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